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Chapter One: Introduction 
I: Introduction 
Morocco is a state of many nations. The throngs of people on the streets 
of Tangier, Rabat, Essouaria, and Zagora represent an immense variety of 
different backgrounds. Cultural diversity and political correctness are 
concepts that have not entered the intellectual discourse of Morocco let alone 
become a concern of the rural farmer. Yet Moroccans hold senses of identity 
connected to their historical and ethnic backgrounds. Historically, many of the 
Moroccan peoples were organized tribally and drew much of their regional 
identity from these groupings. Now, the significance of tribes has reduced to 
such an extent that larger groupings have become more important; however, 
the heritage of this background remains strong. Amazight ethnicity depends 
on the continuity of tribal forms. 
While other ethnic identities, such as Jewish, Bedouin, and sub-
Saharan African, represent significant portions of the Moroccan population, 
this study focuses on the Amazights in the Morocco of today; that Morocco is a 
developing country struggling to catch up to the Western World that has so 
strongly influenced it. The Amazight is a group of people of unclear 
geographic, historical, and ethnic origin; "a composite people; ... the affinity 
among the various people seems to be solely linguistic" (Nelson 1985:4). 
Although their tradition traces their origins to two unrelated families; 
Amazights have now grown to account for an unknown, but large, percentage 
of the population, anywhere from 20 to 80 percent (e.g. Hoffman 1967: 19, 
Wolfert 1973: 13). The discrepancies in the figures stem from the Moroccan 
census that does not include Amazight/Berber as a choice for either ethnicity 
or primary language. This segment of the Moroccan population is redefining 
itself in the context of a state dominated by French and Arab influences; the 
Amazight are taking new pride in their language and heritage and seeking to 
break into government in a more active way in an effort to define themselves 
as a cultural driving force. 
This study will demonstrate that the Amazight are a distinct ethnic 
group in Morocco, despite the common interpretation in scholarly and 
everyday discourse that they are merely groups of people speaking one of the 
Amazight language and not representing a distinct cultural entity. The study 
will go on to examine the ramifications of this ethnic identity and the heritage 
of the historical and tribal roots of the Amazight in light of nationalism, state 
building, ethnicity, and cultural marginalization. 
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II: Fieldwork and Methodology 
The core research for this study was done over a three week period from 
April 20 to May 11, 1996 as part of the School for International Training 
College Semester Abroad in Morocco, Spring 1996. Dr. Susan Schaefer Davis 
and Dr. Abdelhay Moudden served as my advisers. I interviewed 
approximately thirty people representing both Arab and Amazight identities, a 
wide variety of adult ages, and both men and women. Of course, some were 
much more valuable as sources of information and/or insight that others 
While I had a set of questions in mind, a formal interview with a list of 
question, paper, pen, and a cassette recorder proved to be an ineffective 
strategy. Most of my information comes from casual conversations that I 
framed around my questions. These were two way conversations with people 
just as eager to understand me and my background as I was to understand 
them and theirs. 
Furthermore (and most frustrating), the data are limited by time and 
access issues growing out of language limitations and aspects of being a 
woman interacting with Moroccan cultures. The majority of my informants 
are young males. This is because I had to access people through the public 
sphere, a male dominated environment in Morocco. This category of the 
population is the most willing and accessible even within the public sphere as 
(given the unemployment problem in Morocco) they had the time to talk to me. 
In most cases, to meet women I had to be invited into the homes of the men 
whom I had met in cafes, etc. This required a degree of trust in these men 
that I did not always have (not to mention the implication about my character 
that such an action would have meant to other Moroccans). 
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Additionally, particularly in Setti Fadma, the language barrier was an 
issue. This was an issu~most problematic with children and women. The 
vast majority of the conversations upon which this study is based took place in 
French with some in English. Arabic was used mostly as a rapport builder. 
As my topic focused on Amazight peoples, many of my informants spoke an 
Amazight language in daily life. Man:y females, who are educated in 
significantly smaller numbers than males, spoke only one of the three 
Amazight languages. Others spoke Amazight and Derija, the Moroccan dialect 
of Arabic that differs from Fousha, the Modern Standard Arabic (so much that 
they are not really mutually intelligible). Morocco: A Country Study tells us 
that only one percent of Riffian Amazight women speak another language in 
addition to Riffian Amazight; the statistic is significantly higher in other areas 
(fifty-eight percent in the Middle Atlas) (Nelson 1985: 114). 
I spent research time in five different communities. A total of eight 
days were spent in the urban areas of Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakech, a 
historically Amazight city. I was in Khemisset, a provincial capital perhaps 75 
km outside Rabat, for six days. This town is noted for its weekly carpet souk 
(market). It is close to the Middle Atlas mountains, therefore it is populated 
by both Arabs and Am'azight, who are probably the majority of the population. 
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The rest of my time was spent in Setti Fadma, a small almost entirely 
Amazight village approximately 65 km south of Marrakech in the High Atlas 
Mountains. This town is the site of a saint's tomb dedicated to the daughter of 
Mohammed the Prophet, Fatima. The tomb is the site of a moussem (religious 
festival in honor of a saint) held each August cited as one of the three most 
important in Morocco (Rough Guide 1995: 298). The economic activities of the 
town include goat, sheep, and cow pastoralism. In addition, there is limited 
cherry, apple, and other terrace horticulture. A few families engage in the 
potentially lucrative; but risky, walnut harvesting. The town is becoming 
increasingly dependent on tourism to the nearby cascades both by Moroccans 
and foreigners. This made it significantly easier for me to interview in this 
town than other small villages that I had visited . . 
People and their opinions that I cite in this paper are often only 
representative examples. Wherever possible, I have let an interviewee speak 
(through my translation) rather than choosing their words for them. Names of 
cited informants appear with some biographical information as an appendix. 
An important word choice I have made is to refer to this segment of 
Moroccan society as "Amazight", a word coming from their languages meaning 
"free man", rather than Berber. The second term is the one most commonly 
found in the literature, however, it is related to "barbarian". For obvious 
reasons, the Amazight people, particularly those living in southern Morocco, 
have strong objections to its connotations and demand the use of "Amazight" 
instead. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Foundations 
I: Ethnicity 
In order to fully grasp the placement of the Amazight within Moroccan 
society and to connect this study ~}a'ore general cultural processes, it is 
necessary to look at the theories of ethnicity circulating today. Fredrick 
Barth's Ethnic Groups and Boundaries is one of the most influential works in 
this area However, there are many other theories of varying utility. In the 
case of the Amazight, it is interesting to consider their ethnicity in light of 
immigration theory. These theories allow one to define the Amazight as a 
distinct ethnic group rather than a linguistic unit in all other respects like the 
remainder of the Moroccan population. 
Relevant to discussion of ethnicity are the distinctions between ethnic 
categories, ethnic identities, and ethnic groups. These terms may be seen as 
levels of a hierarchy in that order. Only when a community of individuals 
reach the level of "group" do they become a culturally and socially significant 
category.! An ethnic category exists when characteristics may define an 
individual as a member (or not as a member) of the category. As a category is 
not a culturally and socially salient method of categorization, this is a low 
level distinction. Ethnic identity comes with self-subscription to a category. 
1 Cultural significant is taken to mean that cultural forms are effected by this trait. Socially 
significant indicates that the organization and institutions of a society are in some way dependent 
on the described trait. 
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This level is culturally and socially significant. However, an ethnic group is 
the only level in which there is a social component. To define ethnic group, 
persons share an ethnic identity and use that iden~ity as a primary basis for 
social organization (Casson 1994). 
In order define ethnicity, there are four major areas of concern. The 
term "ethnic group" as defined above may be applied to peoples meeting the 
following criteria. 
• An ethnic group must be a biologically self perpetuating population. 
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• They must share cultural values and beliefs and express this in overt 
cultural forms. 
• A field of communication and interaction between the members must 
be defined. This factor is often defined by a common language not 
shared with other groups. 
• A group must identify with a cultural category that defines and 
distinguishes them from all others (Barth 1969: 10-11). 
Although much of the anthropological literature has discounted the 
usefulness of making ethnic distinctions between Arabs and Amazight, 
ethnicity is a salient feature in the social, cultural, and political construction 
of Morocco. This is demonstrated by the etically definable ethnicity of the 
Amazight. Other sections of this study will look at these traits in greater 
deta~l. However, to briefly fit the Amazight into this model, they meet the four 
criteria. As they have retained systems of kinship and tribal ties, they have 
maintained an at least partially biologically self-perpetuating population. It is 
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important to regard ethnic groups not as completely closed systems, but rather 
as a component of larger society with permeable boundaries; nevertheless, the 
internal cohesion of the group is maintained. The Amazight certainly share 
cultural beliefs and values, as demonstrated by their own statements and 
outside observation. Moreover, the Amazight have their distinct languages. 
Finally, the Amazight do identify themselves and are identified by others as 
belonging to a distinctive category. 
At this point, it also important to stress that there is no implication of 
equality in "ethnic group" status. Indeed, ethnicity has often been the basis 
for the maintenance of an intrinsically unequal system, as in the case of 
slavery or policies regarding Native Americans in the United States. 
Paul Starr has provided an etic "checklist" of ethnicity that is applicable 
to the case of the Amazight and many others. It depends on what he calls 
"features" (physically definable aspects) and "dimensions". However, Starr is 
not implying that appearance plays a large role in ethnicity. The items to look 
for include: language; vocabulary; dress (including colors and styles of dress 
shared with other ethnicities); tattoos, body scarring, and other methods of self 
marking; residence patterns, particularly those that associate groups with 
difference communities, and individual's names (Casson 1994). All these items 
are present to varying degrees among the Amazight peoples. 
Barth has provided a key element to the study of ethnicity by expanding 
concerns in his refocusing onto the cultural. He moves away from the four 
criteria listed above. This does not mean that he invalidates them; rather he 
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sees them as results and not markers of ethnicity. His ethnic groups are 
defined simply as cultural bearing units (Barth 1969: 11). His most significant 
contribution is the notion that people in the same cultural category can engage 
in very different activities in very different environments; for example, the 
Amazight rural pastoral nomad and the Amazight urban shopkeeper are both 
Amazight. This is due to the shared "basic value orientation" that, along with 
the other elements of their culture, defines a group of people as an ethnic .. 
group (Barth 1969: 11-12). To Barth self-identification becomes paramount. 
In this case study, the self-identification criteria is certainly meet. 
This leads into the next major concern of his work; boundaries and their 
maintenance. While some ethnic groups have little or no contact with others, 
most have to establish a system to maintain their ethnicity while engaging in 
a society with other ethnic groups. The ethnic groups modifies some modes of 
interaction, cultural behavior, etc. therefore "insulating parts of the culture 
from confrontation and modification" (Barth 1969: 16). Flow across the 
boundaries, as in the extensive intermarriage of the Amazight with Arabs, 
may increase the stability of the system by keeping the population at a level 
that can be maintained by the cultural norms (Barth 1969: 23). 
Barth also makes the important point that ethnicity may be situational. 
People define their ethnicity more or less specifically in different 
circumstances. An interesting example of this is terminology used to describe 
Americans of Asian and Pacific Island descent. Many will adopt the 
generalized term "Asian-American" in situations of mixed ethnicity, 
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particularly in the presence of non-As ian-Americans. However, many also 
maintain a more specific ethnicity, such as Korean-American or Japanese-
American, used under circumstances where the country of origin is more 
important (Espiritu 1992: 15). Additionally, an ethnic identity may become 
more or less important as circumstances change. 
To further explore changes in expression of ethnicity, a theory from 
immigration and ethnicity may be invoked. In this model, the first generation 
retains its ethnic identity, the second generation rejects it, and the third 
generation reclaims the ethnic identity of the first generation (Hurh 1980: 46). 
This model may be applied in the case study at hand for specific political 
reasons. As Morocco was a colonized nation until 1956, it is essentially a new 
nation. The Amazight are in many respects in a situation similar to 
immigrant groups as they have lived under the domination of another group 
for this entire~ The first generation may be seen as the Amazight under the 
late French Protectorate and early independence, who maintained their 
ethnicity through government policy and an their struggle for independence. 
The second generation discarded their ethnic identity in an attempt to belong 
to a new category -- Moroccan. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons to be 
discussed, the Amazight ended up in a subordinated position. This, as in the 
case of immigrants, resulted from the retention of an ethnic category by the 
dominant ethnic group. The generation that is now in their late teens to late 
twenties belongs to the third generation of post colonial Amazight. Following 
the pattern observed in Asian and other immigrants to the United States, this 
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generation is reclaiming the ethnicity of the first generation. Also reflecting 
the immigrants on whom the theory is based, this generation exists in 
different social and political circumstances that prevent a complete reversion. 
Instead, the third generation negotiates a new ethnicity based on the current 
situation and on their heritage. In the immigrant case, this results in 
composite identities, like Korean-American (Hurh 1980: 60). For the 
Amazight, and other groups for whom this model may work, the new identity 
may not have a new label but a reformulation of the original ethnicity. 
Important models can also be gleamed from several other theories of 
ethnicity. Abdo 1. Baaklini proposes several characteristics of ethnic conflict 
that are useful for this study. His theory is based on Lebanese ethnic conflict 
and is concerned with political forces. It views ethnic groups as political actors 
who change strategies to gain the greatest possible share of power (Baaklini 
1982: 50). This approach also broadens the scope of consideration of ethnicity. 
Rather than limiting conflict to those between ethnic groups, it recognizes that - ,.....,...-. . 
conflict within an ethnicity is key in its development and maintenance (or lack 
thereof) (Baaklini 1982: 51). Moreover, it rejects inevitability based on the 
usual divisions of ethnicity, race, class, etc. Instead, ethnic conflict in 
pluralistic societies is based in three dynamics. First, inter-ethnic and intra-
ethnic conflict are instrumental in the society at large. Second, secular and 
nationalistic forces appealing across ethnic boundaries in turn exacerbate and 
accentuate ethnic conflict. This is because they do not adhere to the usual n 
societal mechanisms. Eventually trans-ethnic groups are seen as usurping 
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power. Finally, integrative institutions, such as the military, a single strong 
leader, or political systems that do not recognize ethnic difference, will not 
succeed in controlling conflict as well as representative institutions may. 
Although Morocco is not experiencing ethnic conflict to the same magnitude as 
Lebanon and many other contemporary states, these models of conflict are 
applicable. 
A symposium at the 1979 American Psychological Association 
Convention proposed a graduate curriculum for "Ethnic Psychology". This 
sequence of classes would address six areas of concern for those practicing 
psychology in a world diversified by race, culture, and ethnicity. The six areas 
are cognitive process, perceptual processes, mental health, attitudes and 
personality, value, and group process (Ramirez and Ossorio 1982: 285). For 
these purposes, three of the areas are important. "Values" deals with 
"assimilation, acculturation, family, and cultural values." "Perceptual 
processes" are "self-perception, self-esteem, self-concept, and ethnic identity." 
"Group processes" refers to "intergroup conflict, cooperation, and separatism, 
group identity, ethnic group relations, [and] intra-.group conflict" (Ramirez 
and Ossorio 1982: 285). These categories point to the issues that should be 
kept in mind when attempting to grapple with ethnicity. In addition, the 
areas of concern also point to the two dimensions of "groupness". A group has 
both conceptual and organizational dimensions. The two may be difficult to 
separate and may also be at odds (Espiritu 1992: 15). However, it is important 
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to keep in mind that these two dimension must remain for a group to maintain 
cohesion. Additionally, any group depends on individuals to maintain it. 
Ethnicity is a broad and difficult concept to systematize into a concise 
set of points. However, the above theories do well at sign posting things to 
look for as one embarks on a study of ethnicity (in this case the Amazight). 
The Amazight do in fact have the sufficient cultural distinctiveness to be 
considered a group separate from the Arabs. Additionally, they see themselves 
as forming a distinct group. Attention must be paid to the process of self-
identification and outside identification. At this time, the Amazight are 
engaged in a low level ethnic conflict. This stresses the importance of group 
cohesion and group processes. One must also look to the political system to 
find the source and solution to the need for the Amazight to state their ethnic 
identity in concrete terms in the Post Colonial Moroccan state. 
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II: Political Symbolism 
Just as tools were needed to understand the ethnic issues involved, one 
must also look briefly at political symbolism. By looking to the theory of 
political symbols, it becomes clear how and why certain events and behaviors 
take on significance. 
To pick a prominent theorist in the area once more, Abner Cohen 
provides powerful tools for dealing with this topic. Fundamentally, his theory 
states that human beings and the societies that they create have two 
dimensions. In the case of people, these dimensions are political and 
symbolist. "Normative culture" will also express two dimensions, political and 
psychological (Cohen 1979: 99). Symbolism unites the dimensions of each 
layer as well as the humans and their societies. As might be expected, Cohen 
suggests that symbolism has two dimensions, existential and political. Both 
these dimensions may be manipulated (Cohen 1979: 98). 
In order to discuss political symbols, "politicar' must be defined. 
Throughout this study, Cohen's definition will be adopted. Politics is the 
"distribution, maintenance, exercise of, and struggle for power within "a social 
units;" all relationships and power dynamics contribute to this system (Cohen 
1979: 88). To paraphrase Cohen, individuals, collectively or not, will 
continually exert pressure on the state just as the state will continually exert 
pressure on them (Cohen 1979: 88). Power is also the common denominator of 
political and economic concerns; this power is articulated in kinship, ritual, 
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and other components of culture (Cohen 1979: 88, 110). Therefore, power is 
always at the core of the discussion of this study, whether or not this is 
articulated overtly. 
Symbols organize all culture, to a certain degree. Political relationships 
are no exception. The most politically significant symbols are overtly non-
political; the less obviously political a symbol is the more efficacious it is 
politically. As symbols are by definition ambiguous, they depend upon the 
interpretation of the members of a society (Cohen 1979: 87). For example, the 
religious festival lid Kahbir (literally, the big feast) calls for the slaughter of a 
sheep by every Muslim family. The king of Morocco is the religious leader; his 
,/ Q...,-' 
/" religious edit is almost as good as the word of the Qur'an. Unique to Morocco, 
King Hassan II has more than once (including 1996) declared that he will 
slaughter the only sheep in the place of all members of his state. This decision 
is ostensibly because of the high price of sheep, partially due to a small supply 
of Moroccan sheep. This would create undue economic hardship for the entire 
country as sheep would have to be imported, raising the price. The king 
slaughtered his sheep publicly, broadcasting the event on television. While 
this was a religiously symbolic act, motivated by economic pressures, it quickly 
became a political symbol. While many families were happy to be relieved of 
the burden of time, expense, and having to eat all that sheep meat (which 
takes a very long time), others resisted. As with my host family, they chose to 
obey the word of the king, but not his intention. Rather than slaughtering a 
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sheep, they bought pieces of sheep representative of all parts. They did watch 
the sacrifice on television, and then prepared their feast. While this was 
somewhat resistant to the power of the king, defiance was expressed strongly 
in rural areas. As most families do not have a television, so could not 
participate in the collective sacrifice, and many are sheep farmers facing 
~. potential ruin by the edf( they came to regard the king's action as directed 
against them. Many families chose to have a larger than normal lid Kahbir. 
Additionally, Morocco has a festival to celebrate the king's birthday. Although 
celebrations are typically smaller in rural areas, the event went by virtually 
unnoticed in these areas in 1996. However, these events were not overtly 
conceptualized as political resistance. Rather, they saw resistance-was as a 
function of the supply of sheep. The lack of celebration due to the flooding of / 
the previous months and the economic situation caused by the crash of the 
sheep market. As the rural population had abundant sheep, they saw no 
reason to cancel lid Kahbir. While these factors may have played a role, all 
the events took on political symbolism centering on the power of the king. It 
will become more significant later in this study that responses fall on urban 
and rural divides. 
Political symbols, as covert mechanisms, are omnipresent 2!! social 
/ 
- ( \ 
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organization. It is important to recognize that these symbols order experience 
and structure, but do not define it. Symbols may either uphold or change the 
existing systems. Power and symbolism pervade all levels of social and 
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cultural life (Cohen 1979: 110). However, they are the instruments of change . 
..-t-. 
Although he uses a differenC9-vocabulary, Bruce Lincoln writes the following: 
To hold that thought is socially determined does not mean that all 
thought reflects, encodes, re-presents, or helped replicate the established 
structures of society, for society is far broader and more complex than its 
official structures and institutions alone. Rather, such a formulation 
rightly implies that all the tensions, contradictions, superficial stability, 
and potential fluidity of any given society as a whole are present within 
the full range of thought and discourse that circulates at any given 
moment. Change comes not when groups or individuals use 
"knowledge" to challenge ideological mystification, but rather when they 
employ thought and discourse, including even such modes as myth and 
ritual, as effective instruments of struggle. (Lincoln 1989: 7) 
Thus, power and politics mediated by symbols become a primary concern, 
because they can both change and sustain a system. Power and the struggle to 
attain it, most often achieved at times of flux, will remain a key issue. 
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Chapter Three: History, Organization, and Politics 
I: Historical Background 
It is important to place the Amazight in their historical perspective for 
it is here that the antecedents for characteristics of the contemporary 
Amazight may be found. To briefly summarize the major cycles of Moroccan 
history, tribes with limited spheres of influence had carved up between. As ~-
they divided these areas among heirs, Morocco became increasingly 
fragmented. In the late seventh and early eighth century, Arabs successfully 
brought Islam to Morocco through military conquest and settled as a ruling 
urban elite. The Amazight quickly adopted Islam in large numbers, unifying 
Morocco at least on one subject. Moulay Idriss, an Arab who had settled with 
an Amazight tribe established the first Islamic dynasty. This dynasty saw the 
rise of Fez, with its inhabitants declaring themselves to be Arabs by virtue of 
their physical location and political allegiance. It is probable that most of 
these Fassis were predominately Amazight (particularly on the maternal side). 
The glory of this dynasty was short-lived as a fast turnover of Amazight tribes 
supplanted the Idrissis and then each other. The Almovids, the next 
significant dynasty, brought "nominal political unity to all present day 
Morocco" and actively participated in the Abbasid Caliphate. In time, they too 
fell, this time to the Almohads, another Amazight dynasty, who by 1140 
occupied most of Morocco. The third significant Amazight dynasty was the 
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Merinid, who took the Almohadi capital of Marrakech in 1271. They were the 
last of the Amazight dynasties, simply fading away into a period of power 
struggles from 1415 until the early 17th century rise to power of the illouite 
dynasty that holds the throne to this day. The Alouite used a plea of direct 
descent from the prophet, Mohammed, and therefore a claim of Arab identity 
to gain popular support (Nelson 1985). While this brief summary serves only to 
fit the right names and time periods together, it demonstrates that the 
Amazight were a powerful political force through much of Morocco history. 
International influence has always been strong in Morocco. This 
influence is by virtue of the geographical position of Morocco. Situated at the 
5 
Atlantic entrance to the Mediterranean Sea, with coast on both bodies of 
water, Morocco has long been an influence on and influenced by the heavy, 
multinational commerce of the Mediterranean. Moreover, their position at the 
top of trade routes across the Sahara from Sub-Saharan African nations has 
brought a strong cultural and economic tradition. The proximity of Spain, 
merely 15 kilometers across the Strait of Gibraltar, also encouraged close 
connections to Europe. However, the most influential international influence 
was the 20th century period of French Protectorate, more overt than other 
demonstrations of influence, forcing Sultan Mohammed V into exile. This 
French occupation brought a powerful Western style presence and all its 
ramifications into Morocco. Although it took many years, the French 
eventually gained control of all the tribes of l\iorocco for the first time in 
// 
21 
history and established a government and urban society that reflected the 
European heritage of the colons. 
If "the course of Moroccan history before the protectorate was seen as 
the efforts of the Arab government forces to impose themselves on Berber 
dissidents," French colonialism left behind the mechanism to put the Arabs 
firmly in control, and the Arabs and the Amazight found themselves in .a/new 
I 
positions to fight for dominance of the Moroccan cultural and political life 
(Burke qtd. in Seddon 1982: 29). 
II: Ramifications of Segmentary Lineage and Tribal 
Heritage 
22 
The early historical record o~1V1:orocco is devoted to the waxing and 
waning of the relative powers of competitive tribes. These tribes were what 
actually organized the people on the ground; they were responsible for cultural 
structure that shaped social, political, and even economic life. 
Segmentary Lineage and Tribes 
Mfiliation to a tribe is generally made genealogically, often based on 
segmentary lineage systems of kinship (Coon 1931: 72). The tradition of origin 
and descent is usually rooted in legend; however, the legend is flexible enough 
to meet the current needs of political situation of the tribe. (Seddon 1981: 86). 
Segmentary lineage is usually summed up in cliched expression "I against my 
brother; my bother and I against my cousin; my cousin, my brother, and I 
against the world." The system is based on patrilineal descent and 
occasionally tweaked so that it balances exactly. Each level of descent has an 
equal and opposite counterpart from the individual household to the entire 
tribe. Generally, each level had some form of leadership and corresponding 
scope of power. For example, the Saharan nomads called Tuareg are 
structured family, faction, clan, tribe, confederacy, nation of Tuareg, with each 
level building on the previous (Briggs 1960: 126). The higher the level the 
more nebulous the affiliation is from an emic perspective. The Tuareg, to 
continue the example, will classify each other by tracing the family line 
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starting with the parents until a mutually known or connected relative of 
ancestor is discovered. They also know who is not "Tuareg", although they do 
not always know what their tribe is called, nor be able to name their nation by 
its common etic appellation of "Tuareg". Rank and responsibility belong to 
some segment of the lineage, and not to an individual. Entire clans can 
change their distribution with over arching levels or organization to ease 
conflict. This leads to a kind of collective responsibility that is key to 
understanding the "law and order" heritage of Morocco. 
Many tribes had other organization strategies, usually in addition to 
segmentary lineage. For example, the Riffian tribes had a "highly complex" 
governmental system attached to their segmentary lineage system. This 
system was essentially composed of three councils arranges hierarchically. 
Often membership was elected. First was the village council responsible for 
minor social transgression. Above that was the "council of the great"; usually 
this council covered the same area as a souk and regularly met there. They 
were responsible for inter-village conflict and greater social transgressions. 
Finally, there was a tribal council that handled major issues with their own 
tribe and inter-tribal conflict and wars that were a staple of early Morocco 
(Coon 1931: 83, 142). 
Thus, tribes were set up to organize all of their members; some grew in 
power sufficiently to control other tribes. When there were dynasties ruling 
greater Morocco, in a model constructed by Ernest Gellner, tribes fell into one 
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of three categories. Those who ruled, those who paid allegiance and taxes, and 
those who refused to recognize the ruling tribe (Seddon 1981: 31). While this 
may be an oversimplification, it demonstrates how Morocco was a patchwork 
or tribes and not a cohesive unit. 
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Tribes, Power, and Politics 
Tribes remain an intriguing issue in the political, "law and order" lives 
of Amazights as well as maintaining their position as a defining factor in the 
identity of the Amazight. Tribes essentially formed the political organization 
of Morocco until the mid twentieth century; they were "the most intricate level 
of social and territorial organization in Morocco" (Miller 1984: 195). They have 
not disappeared completely today despite a constitutional monarchical 
government that runs the state of Morocco. The sense of justice that 
accompanied tribal law remains strong in the value system today. The 
mechanisms continue to be invoked in informal cases and those outside the 
realm of Moroccan law. More importantly, tribes are fundamental to the 
identity of their members. James Miller lists three factors that define the Ait 
Mizane, a neighboring tribe to the residents of Setti Fadma. The environment 
and Islam provide two of the threads, but the third is the tribe, "the social 
organizer of local land and life, powerful symbolic repository of past 
experience, and a vehicle through which people meet the challenges of 
everyday life" (Miller 1984: 6). 
One of the more significant ramifications of the traditional structure of 
Morocco is the informal organization and justice mechanisms that are still 
invoked frequently today. Mohammed told me about a case in his tribe. There 
was a man in Khemisset who was often late for appointments or missed them 
altogether. Finally, a business associate became annoyed enough that he went 
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to the oldest man in the tribe for advise. As there is no longer a formal power 
structure within the tribe, the oldest man fills the role that could be termed 
"chief'. This echoes the cultural beliefs in the superiority of the wisdom of 
males and elders. The elder proposed a solution; the next day about 40 people 
turned up at the offender's home shortly before lunch. Of course, he was 
obligated to feed all of them or lose his honor and reputation. This is because 
a gracious and generous host is one of the first ideals of Amazight personality 
theory. Despite this informal power, the tribes lack real leverage. 
Most of my informants knew of and took pride in their tribe as a source 
of identity. Several of my informants, including Akhmed, had ridden for their 
tribes in a Fantasia. "Fantasia" is the word used in Amazight and Arabic 
(although clearly of French origin) to describe a traditional Amazight event 
that celebrates tribal pride. Fantasias are commonly convened in the spring 
and fall. They may be in honor of an important wedding or other significant 
individual event; however, they are more often a large party for everyone. 
Often they are timed to coincide with a religious celebration. For these 
celebrations, a tribe sends its best horses and horsemen dressed in their finest 
clothes and riding tack. The participants gallop down a field surrounded on all 
sides by spectators. As they approach the end of the field, all the riders stop 
their horses dead in their tracks then twirl and fire rifles in unison. 
Elaine Combs-Schilling provides an analysis of the Fantasia as an event 
that "without much subtlety ... mimics the sexual act" (Combs-Schilling 1989: 
203). However, she also points to another significant element of symbolism--
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control. Just as the rider must remain in control of his mount and his 
emotions if he and his team perform well or poorly (Combs-Schilling 1989: 
204), the event also celebrates the control of the tribe. The Fantasia is a 
condensed expression of tribal pride and cohesion. The actual contests of the 
. Fantasia recall the military past of independent tribes and evoke pride in the 
heritage of the tribe. As collective contests, they rely upon the unity of the 
related men. Surrounding events of the Fantasia also stress the unity of tribes 
as well as reinforce their relationships with between tribes. Many families 
erect tents on the site, and the most powerful entertain large groups of people. 
The event provides a forum for the contracting of marriages, business 
contracts, and all other inter-family matters. Formerly, Fantasias were the 
locus of inter-tribal and tribal decision making. Now, they are almost 
symbolic calls on the tribal identity while concretely stating the social 
relationships between members. 
Akhmed is extremely sad that the power of his tribe has diminished 
within his lifetime. He said that the tribe is just not well enough organized to 
wield any real power. He felt that there was greater justice under tribal law, 
but Arab law and domination of the educational system has prevented the 
young Amazight from studying their own heritage in order to even know that 
they are being oppressed. Instead, young tribe members look to the 
government for leadership. This is despite their elders efforts to teach them to 
take pride in their tribe. However, this trend is subject a reversal at this time. I .•••. ~-
I found in the young an increasingly strong interest in the tribe and the 




Political Heritage of Tribes and Amazight Ethnicity 
There are political ramifications of tribal heritage and Amazight 
identity. David Sedan writes, "tribal divisions, which frequently coincide with 
electoral boundaries, although they have not been of general political 
importance ... are of some importance in that their persistence as cultural and 
ideological entities cast local politics in a distinctive and somewhat restricted 
mold" (275). It is this level of politics that the Amazight I met seemed most 
interested in; however many are interested in using their interrelated 
Amazight ethnicity and tribal identity to bring issues to national attention. 
Another slant on this is to make tribal/Amazight identity a national 
issue unto itself. After independence, there have been various political parties 
viewed as "Berber" by the Moroccan populace. This is partially because they 
represent the economic concerns of the mostly rural farming and pastoral 
Amazight and partially because they appeal to Amazight identity to garner 
support (Seddon 1988: 167-183). However, the distinction between the two 
concerns-is not as great as it may seem due to the strong correlation between 
rural living and Amazight ethnicity. Although these parties have yet to gain 
significant political power, that they exist at all indicates an interest in the 
making Amazight identity one of political significance. As the younger 
generations age into politics, particularly the newly urban Amazight youth, it 
is likely that this movement will become stronger. 
At a more subtle level, Amazight identity already plays a greater role in 
Moroccan politics. Amazights have been regarded almost universally in 
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Moroccan history as "dissidents", not succumbing to Roman or Arab rule, not 
even to Amazight dynasties. They continued this tradition in resisting French 
colonialism and participating in the struggle for independence. In recent years 
there have been more Amazight movements in Morocco (Lakhsassi 1996). A 
government publication refers to the organization of local politics as "heir to a 
long past" in clear reference to tribal organization (The Organization ... 54). 
Thus, tribal and Amazight identities continue to playa key role in the 
structure and tone of Moroccan politics. 
However, the extent of the Amazight influence has been limited in the 
post colonial period. Other parts of this study have pointed to the relationship 
between Amazight ethnicity and several factors affecting their placement in 
the power structure. Given the tradition of the Amazight to remain focused on 
their immediate environment, it is logical that they have not succeeded in nor 
have been interested in claiming power at the nation state level. Also, their 
continued participation in rural economies of farming and pastoralism have 
left them out of the greater, international economic market in which urban 
Morocco participates. Although the Amazight used to control the trade routes 
that crossed the Sahara, these trade routes have largely been supplanted by 
other modes and lines of trade. In addition, the colonial period also reduced 
the Amazight's control of these sectors of their traditional economies. The 
educational system and these economic concerns have marginalized the 
Amazight out of the city based wealthy that control the national government. 
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The corrupt national government, in a top down model, has reduced the 
influence of the Amazight in the areas that they demographically dominate. 
The limitation of the scope of influence of the Moroccan tribe also rests 
in the traditional relationship between tribe and sultan. The sultan may be 
seen as analogous to the modern national government, at least in terms of 
attitude. Tribes traditionally felt threatened by the power of the sultan. 
However, they could choose to recognize the sultan only as a religious leader, 
or to not recognize even this religious authority (Miller 1984: 197-98). 
Moreover, the position of sultan was always open to threat from a would-be 
replacement. This fluidity made the central government less threatening 
(Miller 1984: 197). It was trade that united tribes together, not a political 
figurehead. As Miller says "market day has always been truce day in Morocco" 
(Miller 1984: 198). This system allowed a tribe to select a level of involvement 
/ 
in the central government, while also defining that governments role more v/ 
narrowly than the modern government. As such, the tribe after their united 
struggle with the Arabs for independence found themselves in unfamiliar 
political territory. Unable to negotiate terms at that time, they remained 
without a strong voice. 
The younger generations of the Amazight are currently attempting to 
renegotiate this p,osition. As more Amazight move to the cities and circles of 
higher education and power while maintaining their Amazight identity, they 
are using their knowledge of the Morocco of today and their heritage to find a 
role for themselves in a contemporary state that also celebrates their ethnic 
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identity. To separate ethnic identity from tribal identity would be virtually 
impossible in the case of the Amazight. However, this does not mean that the 
tribe as a discrete unit is the source of identity. Rather, the common heritage 
of a tribal structure with all its ideological, organizational, and philosophical 
ideas is shared by all Amazights. This is one of the ways in which a pan-
Amazight identity, despite the linguistic, environmental, geographical, and 
cultural differences between the three major groups is possible. 
Tribalism, in this context, refers to the continuation of the influence of 
the tribe in framing the identity of the individuals that belong to it. In the case 
of post colonial Morocco, the tribe continues to contribute a social and political 
framework to some extent, particularly in the rural areas. As the tribe is no 
S' 
longer invested with formal powers, it lends it weight to more general ~ 
Amazight identity. The population of Morocco is increasingly urbanizing (in 
the last census Morocco was for the first time slightly over fifty percent urban; 
many Amazight are taking their identities with them. They look to their 
tribal heritage for pride and ethnicity as well as for ideology that they are 
using in their efforts to renegotiate their position in the government, power 
structure, and cultural heritage of modern Morocco. 
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III: Arabization and Colonization 
French colonialism was frequently offered to me as a model for 
understanding the coming of the Arabs to Morocco. However, discussion of the 
French Protectorate rarely had the explicit expressions of feelings of 
oppression that accompanied discussion of Arabization/Islamization of 
Morocco. Three factors seemed to be at work. First, people presented that 
model as they felt I would understand it. Analogy was possible without the 
emotion content. Indicative of a distinction between ethnic and political 
domination, the Amazight did not express feelings of oppression under the 
French regime or stated that the oppression was generalized to the entire 
Moroccan population (rather than specific components of it). Finally, because 
the French have essentially left Morocco, leaving it to redefine itself in their 
wake, they are no longer a significant presence. All of these perceptions shape 
attitudes towards both the arrival of Arabs in Amazight Morocco and the 
French Protectorate. Other informants gave a much more peaceful, 
integrationist view of the situations. Both these models and historical events 
have led to a theme of Arab/urban, Amazight/rural identification. 
All of my informants, including the Arabs, stressed the Amazight 
origins of Morocco, directly contradicting the scholarly belief that the Arab 
conquest is culturally seen as the beginning of Morocco, indicative of the 
change in attitudes towards the Amazight (Entelis 1989: 25). The peaceful 
camp, including Salat and Mohammed, presented an arrival of Arabs that was 
34 
essentially a non~military religious conversion. Amazight women married the 
Arab men, and, due to patrilineal descent, the children were considered to be 
Arab and may have learned to speak only Arabic. Their descendants were also 
considered to be Arab; however, many of these individuals have maintained 
closer ties to their Amazight heritage. These families lived in the blossoming 
cities. Saied and Salat brought the argument full circle by declaring that the 
origins of the Amazight peoples lay in ancient migration from the Arabian 
peninsula. Therefore, all Amazight are really Arab in origin, making Morocco 
a purely Arab country. This argument, coupled with the previous statement 
that all "Arabs" in Morocco are Amazight, is a function of (or leads into) a more 
positive attitude towards Arabization. Until recently, people would declare 
themselves to be Arabs as soon as they could due to urban living and language 
usage. Although the peaceful conversion model does not explicitly label the 
Amazight in any negative way, it does stress the method for an Amazight to 
become Arab rather than placing value on Amazight origins. 
Bouchara, Mohammed's younger sister by ten years, is a good 
spokesperson for the alternate viewpoint, as well as the active Amazight pride 
of her generation. She saw a version of Arabization that included a violent, 
drawn out war and ended with a few Arabs ruling tyrannical over a people ------" 
.~"-------~.~ '-.... 
that had previously lived on their own land, speaking their own language, and 
following their own law. All of Morocco was in a similar situation under the 
French Protectorate, by which time the Amazight were well versed in 
integration. Madame Chaoui, an Arab that grew up during the French 
protectorate and hates to speak French despite fluency, also sees Arabization 




The French Protectorate was seen by most as a time that has passed, 
but has left a legacy significant to the Arabs more than the Amazight. It is the 
Arabs that are seen as having adopted cultural traits from the French. More 
significantly, it is the Arabs that are seen as taking over the Western style 
political structure and cultural traits that the French left behind. It is at this 
point in Moroccan history that political domination of the Arabs began (at 
least in the perception of the people I spoke to). Mohammed related that until 
the 1940's many Amazight still lived under tribal law. A historical theme 
became important at this point, with ramifications that reach into the present 
situation. There were always tribes that did not pay allegiance to the ruling 
power; it was not until after exhaustive French efforts that the entire 
population was under one government for the very first time. 
In the early years of the protectorate, the French met resistance from 
the Arab ruling elite and the Amazight, but these resistances were separate. 
Edmund Burke, in his case study of the resistance by the Ait Ndhir (an 
Amazight tribe), points to the bitterness towards the Arabs and to the threat 
of control by the French. Sultan Mohammed IV had attempted to impose 
taxation and administration of the Ait Ndhir in an effort to fortify against the 
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French; this was perceived as a threat to tradition existence, and resisted 
(Burke 1991: 132). Additionally, the French began an armed campaign to 
seize lands that was never entirely successful (Burke 1991: 144). The reason 
that the Amazight resistance was so successful lies in the ethnic characteristic 
of the Amazight. The religious practices of the Amazight connected them 
through a network of similar mystical brotherhoods, but did not establish 
strong ties to the Arabic "high Islam" they theoretically practiced. Secondly, 
the history of the relationship between the Ait Ndhir and the Moroccan state 
(in all its forms as dynasties rose and fell) had never been strong. This is 
similar to the pattern of "dissident Berber tribes" who prefer their structured 
independence to state domination. Lastly, their geographical position had 
directly effected the economic position of the Ait Ndhir. They were excluded t". 
~.---"' 
from the vast wealth that could be found in cities, but gained a lucrative 
position as middlemen between Marrakech and Meknes, only enhanced by 
their transhumant nomadism (Burke 1991: 142-144). These elements enabled 
the segmentary tribe to unite under adversity and unite around some of the 
markers of Amazight ethnicity. 
By employing a simple political theory of domination, the French took 
advantage of this strife and divided the population to gain tighter control. 
During the early part of the Protectorate, the ethnic groups in Morocco were 
gradually manipulated to the advantage of the colonial power. The French 
"converted markets into effective points of tribal control" by exerting their 
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military and governmental presence at the souk (Hart 1972: 35). This is why 
in the 1930 French law referred to as the "Berber Dahir" (law) met with much 
protest from both Arabs and Amazight. As the law officially recognized the 
authority and continuation of customary law and tribunals of Amazight tribes 
only, it would seem logical that the fiercely non-Arab population would 
welcome this validation, but they did not as it inhibited the struggle for 
independence, which had become a common cause of Arab and Amazight in 
direct proportion to the squeezing of the French on the power of Morocco. This 
independence movement correlates strongly to the trend throughout Amazight 
history of resisting the domination of a state or other tribal unit seeking to 
seize more power. 
The historical factors and the events of the French Protectorate had the 
net effect of bringing the Amazight under complete control of the Arabs for the 
first time. The Arabs gained control of the existing structures forseveral 
reasons. They had'been subject to French law for decades longer than many 
Amazight, so were more familiar with it. More importantly, they were the 
inhabitants of the urban areas, where the French had concentrated their 
infrastructure and political development. Many have the opinion that the 
French structure and its remnants denied and continue to deny Amazight 
access to self-determination and effective political and economic power since 




Those who saw Arabization as peaceful seem less resentful of the 
molding of Morocco into a Western style but still Islamic state after 
independence. Proponents of the unwilling conquest of Amazight Morocco by 
Arabs, who mostly belong to the younger generation, see Arabs as unfairly 
dominating Moroccan politics after a long history of futile attempts that the 
traditional structures successfully repelled for centuries. 
The difference in perception and reaction may also lie in the nature of 
the domination. The French Protectorate did not include heavy settling of 
Morocco by the French. Instead, domination was almost purely political and 
military. However, the relationship between Arabs and Amazight bears the 
hallmarks of an ethnic conflict. Using Baaklini's model, the ethnic groups 
involved have acted in many respects like a political actor, and not merely as 
culture bearing units. Moreover, the French Protectorate did enact Baaklini's 
processes. The united independence movement was an example of "secular 
and nationalist forces appealing across ethnic boundaries (Baaklini 1983: 54). 
The new Morocco turned to a political system dependent on a power and 
.. . -
charismatic leader, the (now"" King:' Mohammed V, and then his son Hassan II. 
\-_/ 
Baaklini would term their rules "integrative institutions". Following the 
pattern suggested in this model, the conflict had worsened in the wake of these 
movements. An exploration of the contemporary relationship between the 
Amazight and the government elaborates this worsening of ethnic 
relationships. 
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IV: Amazight Identity and Government Today 
The Relationship between Amazight identity and the Moroccan 
government is seen differently by almost all of my informants. The differences 
seem to stem from the fact that, perhaps counter intuitively, the government is 
more overtly present in rural areas. For example, during my time in Morocco, 
I spent three months in the city of Rabat without any formalized government 
contact, yet in Oulmes, a rural village in which I stayed in for five days, I was 
summoned by the authorities six times for no apparent reason. These 
summons seemed to have been made purely to demonstrate the power of the 
qaid. He just wanted to try out his few words of English or ask if I was 
enjoying myself (of course not until I had waited an appropriately long time).2 
Perceptions of the interconnection of government and Amazight identity 
correlate to the Arab/urban Amazight/rural and class connections. 
Morocco today is governed by constitutional monarchy; however, it is 
one much further towards the absolute monarch end of the spectrum than to 
the figurehead end. Internationally, Morocco lies somewhat in the middle of 
the road, trying to maintain closet ties to the West while also identifying "with 
the aspirations of the Arab world, including the call for Arab unity, opposition 
to Zionism, pride in a common cultural, religious, historical, and linguistic 
heritage, and a desire to assert an authentic Arab identity" (Entelis 1989: 
101). Note that this agenda leaves little room for an international statement 
2 However, this did afford the opportunity to observe the qaid in action. I saw who was seen 
first, who got a shared audience, who saw the qaid alone, etc. 
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of the Amazight-ness of Morocco. The king is the clear driving force behind the 
country's political and governmental decision. The power of King Hassan II is 
bolstered by the magnificent flying buttress of god given right. The king is a 
Sharif, a descendant of the prophet (and therefore Arab), and his job comes 
with the title "Commander of the Faithful"; the faithful being the Muslims 
that make up 99 percent of the Moroccan population. It is illegal to denounce 
the king, and Morocco does hold political prisoners.3 All this makes it unlikely 
that anyone will publicly criticize the king . Abdul prefaced a scathing critique 
of the government with the statement "the King is very intelligent and a 
wonderful person, but those around him - the ministers and all those people -
are corrupt." The last part of this statement is a sentiment overwhelmingly 
shared. The government is seen as badly run, disorganized, and corrupt. 
The circles of the government extending from the king, the object of the 
scorn of the people, are also likely to be Arab. Education, wealth, and urban 
living all aid in developing the social and political rank necessary to become 
powerful. Interestingly, the one sector of the King Hassan II's government 
that was dominated by the Amazight for many years was the military. Entelis 
explains this, "their ethnolinguisitic origin is less important then their 
extremely conservative and nationalistic political views, which stress the need 
for discipline, honesty, and sacrifice at the expense of democracy, liberty, and 
justice" (Entelis 1989: 89). These comments applied to the Amazight at the 
3 In recent years, Morocco has come under considerable international pressure to clean up its 
human right record. 
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beginning of the modern era of Morocco as it emerged from a long battle for 
independence from the French. However, the current state of the Amazight's 
concept of their ethnicity and position in the power structure leads to demands 
for greater say in the governance of a country they see as their own. This, 
coupled with Baaklini's model, explains why the relationship between the king 
and the Amazight dominated army quickly became unstable. In 1963,1971, 
1972, and 1983 either plots were uncovered or military coups were actually 
attempted. All these movements were lead by Amazight military officers 
(Entelis 1989: 89-90). Now the military seems loyal, but is also more Arab. In 
this case, the exclusion of Amazight from positions of power is overt, but also 
suggestive of the more subtle trend for Arab domination of the government. 
Government of rural areas also responds to the ethnicity based power 
structure of Morocco. In the rural areas I have visited, such as Setti Fadma 
and Oulmes, the Qaid is an extremely important figure. Interestingly, the 
title is the same as that of a political figure who governed approximately the 
same jurisdiction under traditional tribal governments. The permission of the 
qaid, and appointed official usually drawn from outside the district--ostensibly 
as the position requires education, is required for any number of things. If one 
wants to build a house, start a business, etc. the must seek the permission of ---the qaid. The qaid can request anyone's presence, as he did in my case, and 
usually gets it, even with much grumbling on the way. The people have a 
great deal of respect for this office, perhaps related to it position in their 
~ 
heritage and the power of the national government. Bila said "the people here 
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[in Setti Fadma] think that the government is a bit like god- you have to do 
what is says." 
.....-".~ 
Government is certainly a heavy handed presence, but the people do not 
feel it is connected to them. When this meets with the independent spirit that 
the Amazight feel characterizes them and a lack of education and the 
empowerment that comes with it, resentment is created. While this is mostly 
a function of rural living (as the rural population is so far from major cities 
where the real political power rests), most rural families are Amazight. 
Setti Fadma has recently been the victim of worse than usual annual 
floods. Many people died, and much property was destroyed. Abdul told me 
that he knew European countries had sent money to Morocco for the town, but 
nobody had received any. He feels this is because of the corrupt government's 
assumption that the town would be too naive to figure it out. While Abdul has 
figured it out, he does not know what to do about it. 
Many of the people that I talked to felt that the end of the French 
Protectorate had left not only the Arabs, but the mostly urban, upper class 
elite in control of Morocco. They feel excluded from politics, but the young aim 
to fight their way in. Bouchara represents the opinion that pressure should be 
put on the king through student activism, academic and intellectual circles, 
etc. Although the king had already recognized the cultural heritage of Morocco 
in declaring his own Amazight roots, even stating that Amazight languages 
should enter schools, nothing has changed. That King Hassan II said this at 
all is a remarkable statement on the increasing political and cultural saliency 
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of Amazight identity. His dynasty came to power by appealing to their status 
of Sharif. As direct descendants of the prophet, they are by definition Arab. 
Yet, the king is now willing to attach an Amazight component to his self-
identity. Bouchara believes that if Amazight issues became a priority for King 
Hassan II or his successor, Amazights would "rise to the top." I also met a 
group of students who believe that revolution is the only to fix the grave flaws 
~-, 
) 




society is one made of a rigid class structure based on ethnicity. 
The present construction of the government affects and is affected by 
Amazight ethnicity in several ways. The present king belongs to a lineage 
that rose to power through and appeal to the purity of its Arab-ness. As direct 
descendants of the Prophet, they are in a sense entitled to power, by virtue of 
being Arab. In addition, the king is supported by a network of ministers, etc. 
that is drawn from the upper class, educated, urban level of Moroccan society. 
This level is predominantly Arab. This same association of the Arabs to urban 
and Amazight to rural also accounts for another factor on the relationship 
between the Amazight and the government. As a rural, undereducated group, 
they are subject to more controlling government and the effects of 
governmental corruption. 
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Chapter Four: Finding Amazight Ethnicity 
I: Perceptions of Amazight Identity 
In the course of this research, the hardest question to find an answer to 
was "what is an Amazight?" Everyone I spoke to and most scholarly materials 
agree that there is a "profound ethnic split in Moroccan Society between Arabs 
and Berbers" (Burke qtd. in Seddon, 1981: 29). However, the difference is hard 
to define, either subjectively or objectively. Perhaps the prevailing definition 
is "Not Arab", but this is not very enlightening. "Amazight" has emerged in 
the Post-Colonial period as~mportant concept in the politics and culture of 
Morocco. Additionally, the heritage of segmentary lineage and tribal 
organization had strong effects today. While the social relevance of Amazight 
ethnicity has been shown, it is not a simplistic exercise to demonstrate the 
cultural significance. Both cultural and social dimensions are required to 
achieve "ethnic group" standing. Starr's "checklist", the four criteria for an 
ethnic group, and problems of ethnic boundaries provide the theoretical 
background for this exploration. Amazight ethnic identity is a broad and 
significant cultural concept. Although it rests on self-identification, the 
psycho-cultural, linguistic, and religious components of Amazight life are 
unique to them. 
Many have reduced Amazight cultural identity to the languages. For 
example, Lakhsassi, a respected Morocco professor of religion who is of 
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Amazight origin, denied that there could possibly be any other measure of 
ethnic identity other than daily use of the language. I engaged him in debate 
on this point, citing examples of people who claimed an Amazight identity but 
did not speak that language. He declared this "impossible." My point that if I 
spoke an Amazight language as my daily language, I still would not be 
Amazight was agreed to by him, demonstrating that he had an underlying 
concept of cultural identity that he failed to recognize consciously (Lakhsassi 
1996). I relate this exchange as it demonstrates the extent to which language 
is used to denote identity. 
This language restricted definition of identity is completely inadequate 
as it disregards other aspects of Amazight culture. Anna, a Peace Corps 
volunteer working in the Amazight village of Setti Fadma and its environs, 
who stated emphatically "a Berber is some one who speaks the language of 
course" would be very surprised to hear Halid say "although I do not speak 
Berber, I am Berber, My mother and father are Berber and raised me in their 
tradition." Further, there are Amazight groups, such as "most of the Jebala-.. 
Chornara-Riffian Tribes" who now use Arabic as there primary (or even only) 
language, but "still retain the rest of their culture" (Hoffman 1967: 22). It is 
this "rest of their culture" that must be define being Amazight. 
Markers of Ethnicity 
Significantly, Moroccans put themselves and others into ethnic 
categories; yet the question "how can you tell if someone is Arab or Amazight 
(Berber)?'~ was almost universally answered "you cannot", or at least one can 
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not know by looking. In Setti Fadma, Jamal told me that it is easier to tell in 
the mountains. The men wear jellabahs (a hooded over garment usually 
described by Westerners as being like a bathrobe), gondoras (a simple shift 
like garment), traditiof\hoes, and carry a small leather bag slung over the 
should like a saddle bag (usually described by shopkeepers, Jamal, and others 
----as "an Amazight bag"). Only Arab women wear the jellabah, added Chebib. 
In the village, I saw many women wearing that traditional head scarf, jewelry 
and other clothing. In addition, the older women in Amazight tribes are still 
tattooed with the facial markings designating their tribe. That the younger 
women do not should not be seen as a sign of reduction of ethnic or tribal .----- " significance; rather, it signifies the spread of a Western beauty ideal and the 
success of a public health campaign against the practice. Ultimately, most 
people said that they had to talk to a person; if their language did not make it 
obvious "the way that they think" will make it instantly obvious (Saied). 
Ethnic Boundaries and Maintenance of Ethnic Identity 
There is frequent intermarriage further blurring the lines between 
Amazight and Arab. (Although most Amazight said that they would prefer to 
marry another Amazight, preferably from the same area/tribe.) Salat said that 
due to intermarriage there are hardly any pure Arabs "perhaps one in a 
thousand." Mohammed M. said "I am an Arab-Amazight-Moroccan. I am half 
Amazight because my mother is Amazight, and half Arab because my father is 
Arab. The left side of me is Amazight and the right side is Arab. I say this 
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because the right side is stronger as it came from my father." This statement 
is revealing on many different levels. It comes from the context of a strongly 
patrilineal society, which partially explains the dominance of the Arab aspect 
of his heritage. Yet, there are other issues at work. 
Basic Value Orientation 
Amazights selected a set of characteristics as descriptive of their ethnic 
group. These characteristics were often stated in opposition to those found in 
Arabs. To list a few, Amazight see themselves as generous, honest, and 
patient. To be an excellent host is a top priority for Moroccans in general, but 
these characteristics better equip Amazights (in their opinion anyway) to 
reach this ideal. In addition, they see themselves as living in the present 
without looking forward and thus causing themselves to worry. They do not 
miss what they never had, leading simple lives. This means that Amazight s 
are happier than Arabs.4 Chebib summed it up as Amazight are always on the 
"straight and narrow"5 while Arabs zigzag. Omar stated that Amazight are 
just nicer than Arabs for three reasons. First, they are fundamentally nice 
people . Second, Arabs are pretentious in manner and self conscious. This 
means that to accept the hospitality of an Arab is an uncomfortable 
experience. "There are certain things you have to do in their homes, and you 
always have to be careful how you hold yourself' he said. In addition, one is 
never invited into the home without an ulterior motive. On the other hand, in 
4 All the characteristics listed here were cited by at least two people. 
5 A loose translation of a French idiom into an English one 
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an Amazight home one is free to do as they please. His characterization 
echoes the theme of the happy, generous Amazight leading a simpler and 
therefore better life. Finally, Amazight are more flexible, quick learners, and 
easily integrate into any situation. James Miller cites this characteristic a 
being key to a Moroccan tribe. Growth, movement, and social flexibility 
enable the continuity of the tribe (Miller 1984: 56). 
The last point is interesting when considered in light of another widely 
cited Amazight characteristic, freedom and independence. Many of my 
~- .. - .~~"~ - ~. . . . .. -.. --.- -._-----
informants were adamant that Amazight do not live under the control of 
others, contradicting history and also their own laments about Arab 
domination of the political and economic spheres. There is way to reconcile 
this paradox. In the Amazight tradition, "ultimately each household or tent 
was its own republic" (Nelson 1985: 5). The Amazight currently feel in control 
of their own families, homes, and flocks, even towns, but also feel disassociated 
from more regional or national issues. Chebib said "Amazight do not think 
much about politics-it is not important here in the mountains." Tempering this 
is the integrationist survival tactic of the Amazight peoples; for it is they who 
have learned Arabic, not the Arabs who have learned Amazight languages. To 
retain their own household size "republics", they have quickly adapted to keep 
others away from the core of their lives and beliefs. In turn, this process has 
maintained their ethnicity. However, as with other Amazight issues, the 
younger generation are taking a more active interest in the higher level 
political concerns. 
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Culturally, Amazight perceive themselves to be different from Arabs, 
yet this is not always valid. For example, the famous Amazight hospitality 
always includes the (in)famous mint tea. Often the subject of "Moroccan wine" 
or "Berber whisky" quips, the Amazight claim the tea as their own tradition. 
When I pointed out to Omar that I had frequently drunk tea with Arabs and in 
Arab homes, he agreed "yes, but it's different. They serve it in cups not 
glasses. " Many other claim that the difference lies in the preparation (with 
the Amazight tea being superior, of course). The word commonly used to 
describe this difference of preparation was usually doucement no matter what 
language the interview was being conducted in. Doucement literally translate 
to "gently", but in Moroccan usage has the connotation of "with care and 
attention, calmly." This harkens back to the self-description of the Amazight 
people are simpler, slower, and living in the present. Interestingly, the Arabs 
do not (in my experience anyway) prepare or serve their tea any differently. 
Furthermore, tea was actually introduced into Morocco via Portuguese and 
Dutch traders on a Europe-China route in the seventeenth century (Loument 
1994: 43). This is one example of several that suggest that both the Arabs and 
Amazight deny their mutual influences upon each other or from the outside. 
Barth identifies a 'basic value orientation" as a marker of ethnicity. In 
this case, a code of values was not easily discernible. However, comments of 
both Amazight and Arabs made it obvious that there was a cultural concept of 
the philosophical nature of being Amazight. Although the psycho-cultural 
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differences between the ethnic groups was at times overstated, this is onto 
itself interesting. In addition, positive and negative value judgments were 
made of perceived cultural traits. This trend demonstrates that the cultural 
and "value" differences themselves are less important than the emic perception 
of these differences. 
Significance of Amazight Ethnicity 
The significance of Amazight identity seems to be changing. People 
were quick to tell m~ that they are Amazight (even before I brought up my 
interest in the topic) while no one told me unprompted that he or sheis Arab. 
Anna, upon hearing what I was doing in Setti Fadma, exclaimed "people will 
actually tell you that they are Berber?! Most people try to hide it." She went 
on to describe how most people will jump to claim Arab ethnicity as soon as 
they put a little distance between the mountains and themselves. No 
Amazight or Arab personally expressed this sentiment to me, but did make 
reference to this feeling in the not too distant past or as one that is a function 
of Arabs sense of superiority. "They," said Allal, who does not like his name as 
it is Arabic, "have erased our identity. To say that you are Amazight is to put 
yourself in the lowest position. But I refuse to stay there." This expressed 
vividly expresses the pride in Amazight identity that I discerned in most 
people. 
Common History as a Source of Group Cohesion 
Much of this pride stems from the Amazight position in history. My 
informants were proud to tell me that the Amazight were the first inhabitants 
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of Morocco. This is in direct contradiction with the prevailing scholarly 
opinion that states "the fact that the Berbers are the original inhabitants of 
North Mrica ... is not mirrored in the folk mind" (Entelis 1989: 25). Moreover, 
the Amazight resented the Arabs for taking a dominant role. Great pride was 
expressed in the Amazight ruling dynasties. Aziz said "we ruled this country 
weIland spread Islam; we did not really need the Arabs." Allal sang a song in 
Amazight that he translated as "we don't want your Islam, we don't want you ..--
language, go away and leave us alone." Clearly Amazight identity is a source 
of pride for many people. 
Urban and Rural Divide 
Halid, who now lives in Rabat, told me that although he is Amazight, it 
did not matter as he lives in the city. This stresses the association of Arabs 
with urban areas, and Amazight with rural areas. Even in Setti Fadma, 
people told me that the "true" Amazight were those living in the mountains, 
living a simple life, and descending to the weekly souk, also described as a 
fundamentally Amazight event (Jamal and Bila). Yet, Halid is not 
representative. Most people stress the retention of Amazight identity even 
after urbanization. 
Even given the urban/rural associations, my informants generally saw 
Amazights as retaining their culture and traditions more strongly than the 
Arabs. Not only do they associate Arabs with urban living, but the next step is 
that Arabs look to Europe and America for models. An Amazight I met in 
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Marrakech was adamant that even urban Amazight are retaining their 
heritage. Jamal said that people might assume that he is Arab as he 
habitually wears Western clothing demonstrating this pervasive Western/Arab 
association. Despite this and their classification of mountain dwellers as 
"real" Amazight, both small town and city inhabitants thought of themselves 
as Amazight. Many of the Amazight families I spoke to had a home in the 
town or city as well as a home in the mountains. I met a family in Oulmes in 
which the Amazight man has two wives. The Amazight wife lives in the 
mountains while the Arab wife live in town with all the modern conveniences. 
Another family I know in Rabat considers themselves to be Amazight, 
although the children do not speak Amazight. They remain connected to the 
countryside, bled, and thus their Amazight identity, by family members 
outside Khemisset whom they visit often. These ties to the bled allow 
Amazight to feel that they are retaining their culture and also strengthens 
Arab/urban Amazight/rural correlations. 
Historically, patterns of Arabs and Amazights vying for power have 
placed them in competitive situations based more on tribal than ethnic 
divisions. The French played upon this competitive history for their benefit, 
but defined ethnicity as the criteria. Now that this competitive spirit is 
restricted within the political boundaries of modern Morocco, ethnic division is 
emphasized. Younger Amazight are taking increasing pride in their identity 
as Amazight. Although the generation before them united with the Arabs to 
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seek freedom from the French, the young generations want equal say in the 
new state but as a separate category from their former allies. While Amazight 
identity may currently be seen through language, self identification is to an 
ever increasing degree the defining characteristic and grounds for pride. 
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II: Language 
Amazight languages are fundamental to Amazight identity. Many 
scholars consider language to be the only marker of ethnicity in Morocco. For 
example, Lakhsassi, Entelis, and others would agree with the conclusion that 
the Amazight are "a composite people; ... the affinity among the various people 
seems to be solely linguistic" (Nelson 1985: 4). Additionally, many people I 
spoke to immediately jumped on the linguistic component as soon as I began to 
describe my interest in the Amazight in Morocco today. They told me stories 
of Americans that spoke Amazight and took great delight in making me use 
my few words of Shluha (central Moroccan Amazight) and teaching me more. 
Many were particularly interested in teaching me the Amazight alphabet. 
Virtually all the Amazight I spoke to denied that language alone made ~ 
Amazight, but language clearly holds a great deal of significance and is a 
source of pride. As an objective marker, many have seized upon language as a 
symbol for more general Amazight identity. 
Scholars of Morocco (and Moroccans) generally consider there to be 
three distinct regions of Amazight peoples that constitute equally distinct 
cultural groups. Equally, they speak three different languages. The three 
zones are usually labeled Riffian, located in the Rif Mountains of northern 
Morocco, Imazighen or Berber living on the east side of the High Atlas and in 
the Middle Atlas mountains, and finally the Shluh of the western High Atlas, 
Ante Atlas, and Southern Morocco (Hoffman 1967: 22-28). Whether the 
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spoken languages constitute languages or dialects of the same language is the 
subject of much debate outside the scope of this discussion, but they do differ 
significantly. Even within the three major groups, wide variation exists. Each 
tribe has a slightly different vocabulary set and pronunciation according to 
Mohammed who wrote an unpublished dissertation on this topic. However, 
most of my informants claimed that all Amazight languages are mutually 
intelligible, although Riffian forms are the most different. "I might not be able 
to really discuss with him, but I understand what he means. After a month or 
two I would be fluent," said Omar of a conversation he was having with a 
Sous.6 
The Amazight languages are considered by their speakers (and 
increasingly others) to be rich and beautiful languages utilizing much poetic 
imagery and rhythmic inflection patterns. This is why Amazight music and 
poetry are so valued by all Moroccans, Salat (an Arab) pointed out. Bouchara 
told me that in the past Amazight languages were thought of only as dialects 
and not "real" languages, lacking grammar, rich vocabulary, alphabet, and 
other characteristics thought to be required for advanced language status. In 
fact all these characteristics are true of these languages, including an alphabet 
specifically designed for Amazight languages. Additionally, Arabic, Latin, and 
international phonetic alphabets are used for transcription. This has been 
done for a variety of Amazight publication, including a now defunct Amazight 
6 The Sous are an Amazight group living in Southern Morocco, stereotypically good business 
people who have established epicerie (small grocery stores) throughout the urban areas. 
newspaper printed in Arabic script. Interestingly, under the same criteria 
applied above, Derija is "only a dialect, not a real language" as it is not a 
written language under any circumstances. 
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Amina, an Arab, told me that her father used to work in a book shop in 
Rabat that carried Amazight publications. When they began teaching 
Amazight languages, the owner was arrested and the shop closed. This 
occurred about seven years ago; however, the status of the languages has 
changed considerably in the intervening time. The year of this research, 
1996, was the debut of a daily ten minute newscast in an Amazight language 
on Moroccan national television. Bouchara explained that this came about 
following a strong movement among Algerian Amazight university students to 
reclaim their language and identity as part of a national political movement 
for Amazight power. The Moroccan government began the newscast because 
"when they saw this, they knew that it was a good thing." A more cynical 
interpretation would be that the Moroccan government wished to prevent 
similar uprisings within its potentially unstable borders. She saw in this 
immense hope for the acceptance of Amazight language and heritage in 
Moroccan. Her enthusiasm was infectious when she spoke of rumors that 
Amazight languages will become an official course of study at some Moroccan 
universities (all but one of which are state institutions) in the 1997-1998 
academic year. Even if the rumors are unfounded, that they exist 
demonstrates clearly the increased value of Amazight language and heritage 
in Moroccan national opinion. 
Language and Education 
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Language and education create many controversial issue in the 
extremely polyglot Moroccan society. Often, when an Amazight begins school 
he or she can speak only one of the Amazight languages. However, few 
teachers speak any Amazight language, nor is it permitted in the classroom 
(even as a teaching tool). Moroccan Arabic is used to teach Modern Standard 
Arabic (MSA, Fousha), the language of education and the upper classes. 
Before this is fully mastered, students begin to learn French. Karima, a 
French teacher in a rural college (the rough equivalent of a middle school in 
the Moroccan interpretation of the French school system), cited this as her 
major problem in the classroom, the source of behavioral problems and 
inability to learn. Ali told me of his first few years in school. He felt 
frustrated and stupid as he struggled to understand what was happening in 
the classroom. He was physically punished by his teachers for speaking 
Amazight in the classroom. He resorted to getting older friends to recap the 
day's events in his native language as they made the three kilometer hike back 
to their homes. He persevered and is how a graduate student. However, his 
sister went to school for only one year but could not learn anything. As 
mandatory education is rarely enforced in Morocco (especially for rural 
females), her formal education ended there. This is one of the ways in which 
the Amazight, intentionally or not, may be marginalized by the structure of 
the Moroccan state. 
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Several movements have begun that would make education in Amazight 
languages available, at least to teach children enough Arabic to enter the 
existing schools. Jamal told me with great pride of a school conducted in 
Amazight in Agadir, and expressed a desire that more would be created. He 
saw Arabic as the unifying language of Morocco (given that the three major 
Amazight languages vary considerably) and therefore it was logical for higher 
education to be in Arabic. This view was shared by most of the people with 
whom I spoke. 
Daily Language 
This raises this issue of daily language. Abdulillah, studying for his 
Masters in English, said "When I was younger, I used four languages 
everyday: Amazight at home, Derija walking to school, Fousha and French at 
school." The majority of people gave less inclusive descriptions of their 
language use. Most claimed that they used their native language most of the 
time. However, my observations showed that many, such as Aziz and Fetiha, 
actually used Derija in equal or greater frequency with each other, friends, 
family, etc. Another common attitude was to make the explicit decision not to 
speak Arabic. Arabic is Omar's last choice language. He would rather use 
French or English with a fellow Moroccan even if Arabic would be a less 
demanding choice. Jamal also cited rejection of Arabic. In Agadir, when a 
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different Amazight form than his native is spoken, he asks for prices in his 
Amazight rather than Arabic else he will be overcharged. He and others 
described Agadir as a center of Amazight activism where European languages 
are more widely spoken than Arabic. The most interesting case of politically 
motivated language choice I encountered was that of an eight year old girl. 
We were sitting next to each other on a long bus trip. When I tried to speak to 
her in Arabic,7 she told me in French that she did not speak Arabic. Upon 
questioning, I learned that she was Amazight, and that her father was a 
politician who did not want her to speak Arabic. She attended a French 
speaking private school. From these examples, it seems that Derija is by 
necessity the common language, almost a lingua franca, of virtually all 
Moroccans. However, many Amazight would rather not use it -- or at least 
prefer to think that they do not speak Derija -- except when necessary. 
Amazight languages provide a more objective method of measuring 
Amazight identity than any other method and are a source of great pride for 
speakers. However, there is much more to Amazight ethnicity than merely 
language. Although forced by school and circumstance to speak forms of 
Arabic, the Amazight continue to see their languages as the most important 
means of communication in daily life. 
7 This was for two reasons. First, I found practicing Arabic with children to be simpler than 
with adults. Also, I assumed that Arabic could be her only language as we were on a bus 
between two urban areas and that French instruction does not begin until about that age. 
III: Religion 
Islam as a faith and as a way of life is the common thread among 
ninety-nine percent of Moroccans. Miller describes Islam as "a socially 
organizing force of spiritual and universalizing intensity, the integrator" 
(Miller 1984: 198). As inhabitants of an Islamic state, all children are 
educated in the public schools to be Muslims. Individuals are legally 
considered to be Muslim by default, and as such are required to fast during 
Ramadan. They also view the king as both their political and spiritual ruler. 
"We are all Muslims, so there is no difference [between ethnic groups]" said 
Anas in the course of a conversation in which he also labeled himself a 
militant Amazight. On one level, Islam does unify all Moroccans as well as 
legitimizing the power of their king through his role of "Commander of the 
Faithful"; however, there are significant differences in local practice of Islam 
that separates the Amazight even in the religious sphere. 
Tombs to saints and the religious brotherhoods attached to them 
constitute the greatest difference at the "Little Tradition" level from the 
Qur'anically prescribed Islam. These tombs, referred to as marabouts (as are 
the saints themselves), dot the bled (countryside) and occasionally pop up in 
the cities. The tombs are objects of hope, sacrifice, pilgrimage, and even 
worship. This practice is not prescribed by the Qur'an, and some schools of 
Islamic thinking feel that it is condemned. Yet these tombs and the 
moussems, festivals held in honor of the marabouts, form the core of the 
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religious practice of (rural in particular) Amazight. Setti Fadma is overlooked ~ 
by a marabout on a mountainside. This tomb is the focus of one of the most 
important moussem in Morocco. 
Although Arabs now practice some of the saint worship and are 
members of brotherhoods, the tradition is believed to have grown out of pre-
Islamic Amazight beliefs. With the expense and difficulty associated with a 
pilgrimage to Mecca, it is possible to make pilgrimages to five specific holy 
sites in Morocco instead. Four of these sites are marabouts. These sites also 
offer a direct sense of participation to its followers, particularly women who 
are generally illiterate and not competent users of Arabic, let alone classical 
Qur'anic Arabic. Amazightare also associated with less than mainstream 
Islamic beliefs. Sufism8 has "found particularly fertile ground in the 
traditions and superstitions of the Berbers. There is little doubt that the cults 
that prosper in Morocco do so in mostly Berber areas" (Simonis and Crowther 
1995: 38). 
Moreover, these religious practices have been used by Amazight in their 
political agenda. "At various times in Moroccan history the Berber's separatist 
aspirations and their reactions against Arab authority ... have expressed 
themselves through the heretical and schismatic doctrines of particularly vivid 
Berber holy men" who probably went on to become saints and the center of 
religious brotherhood practices (Nelson 1985: 137). 
8 Sufism is the mystical i'brand" ofIslam. It may pre-date Islam but has integrated just as the 
marabout practice has. 
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As Jamal pointed out, it is theologically mandated that the Qur'an be in 
Arabic and for Islam to be practiced in Arabic. However, at the mosque in 
Setti Fadma, the verse of the Qur'an at prayers is explained in Amazight, 
otherwise a significant number of people would not understand. This is yet 
another example of slight tweaking of traditional Islamic doctrine that harbors 
traditional Amazight beliefs. Therefore, at the philosophical level, Morocco is 
united by Islam, but daily practice differs by ethnic affiliation. 
63 
IV: Conclusions 
This chapter addressed the cultural components of Amazight ethnicity. 
In conjunction with the earlier chapters, it has been demonstrated that the 
Amazight are indeed a distinct ethnic group. This has been accomplished in 
the following manner. To look first to the definition of "ethnic group" 
predominant in the literature, the Amazight do meet the four criteria. They 
live in largely self-perpetuating biological populations. A strong expression of 
shared cultural beliefs and values was discerned. These were expressed in 
both overt cultural forms and unique cultural forms such as the Fantasia. A 
field of communication and interaction has been defined, largely a result of 
their unique languages. Finally, the Amazight have designated and identify 
themselves with a distinct category. Further, these factors are used for social 
organization. 
In the case of Starr's checklist, the case of the Amazight expresses these 
items. The Amazight do speak a distinct language, and express varying 
vocabulary sets. Dress and tattoos may be distinctive features. Moreover, the 
Amazight show distinct residence patterns, living predominately together and 
in rural areas, thus associating the group with a community. Finally, names 
may be Arab or Amazight. As a result of Islam, many Amazight have Arab 
names, but the owners of these names may resist the connotation. 
Barth, in his discussion of ethnic groups and boundaries stresses the 
shared cultural beliefs that were demonstrated in this case. Most important, 
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Barth stresses self-identification, which is most certainly present in this case 
study. His concepts of situational ethnicity and flow across boundaries aimed ~. 
at protecting the core ethnicity are also demonstrated in this case. 
However, to reduce this analysis to proving a statement of ethnicity 
would show it to be a futile exercise. The significance of this and other 
ethnicities is not the definition, but the causes and effects of that ethnicity. 
This area with be addressed in the next section. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
I am an Arab-Berber-Moroccan. I am half Arab because my 
father is Arab and half Berber because my mother is Berber. 
The left side of me is Berber and the right side if Arab. I say 
this because the right side is stronger as it came from my 
Father 
--Mohammed M. 
These words convey the essence of Amazight identity in Morocco as I 
found it. No ethnic group can define and place itself without the historical and 
political context. History reveals a long tradition of independence; but one 
that is little known in Morocco today. Akhmed, almost angrily, asked me what 
I knew of Amazight history that justified my ability to conduct this project. 
When I gave him a brief summary, he shook his head and looked to the ground 
with tears in his eyes. "You," he said, "know more about the history of my 
people than my children. This is a sad time for me." 
His children do not know this history for several reasons. Ethnographic 
and political analysis of Amazight peoples are nor readily available in Morocco 1...-----
(Moudden: 1996). However, if they were many Amazight would not be able to 
read them. Education conducted in a non-native language marginalizes many 
directly out off the schools, while devaluing an important aspect of self-
identity. 
The Amazight also generally inhabit rural areas, once again a function \. ~ 
history, where resources are simply unavailable. Mter a period of 
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marginalization following independence, the young Amazight are seeking to 
find power. They are using their identity of a differentiated ethnic group as a 
vehicle to achieve their goal of equal involvement at all levels of Moroccan 
society. As contemporary life and world view have expanded Amazight 
horizons beyond their traditional lands, rather than seek and return, they are 
applying tradition models to the current situation. 
Given that the Amazight are the earliest known inhabitants of Morocco, 
one might wonder why now is the time for this movement. The French 
Protectorate was a pivotal point in the history of the Amazight in the system 
that is modern Morocco. Under the French, ethnic differences were 
highlighted by the "Berber Dahir". Moreover, the French were the first power 
to effectively control the entire population, and left this control to the Arab 
urban elite. Thus, the Amazight are struggling for the first time to assert 
their identity and, following a common pattern of many societies, the younger 
generations have taken up this fight. Like Mohammed M., Morocco is 
increasingly recognizing that the Amazight side is integral to its state level 
identity and functioning. The Arab side may stronger, although not greater, 
but the left side is seeking equal prominence. 
The true significance of ethnicity is in these roots. The historical, 
political, and economic issues form a cyclic and reciprocal relationship. Events 
support an ethnic distinction, and the ethnic distinction creates other events. 
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In this case, a long thread of historical conditions has supported an 
ethnic identity. In the Post Colonial period, an intricate expression of 
ethnicity has developed. The struggle for independence from the French 
created a unity between Arabs and Amazight. Yet, as Baaklini predicted, this 
system actually served to accentuate the ethnic differences. In a political, 
economic, and cultural system that has left the Amazight feeling marginalized, 
renewed interest in their ethnic identity as a means for self empowerment has 
arisen in what may be called the third immigrant generation. In this 
situation, we have a youth with a strong interest in perpetrating their 
ethnicity. Although there is a strong correlation between urban-Arab and 
rural-Amazightassociations, economic conditions are forcing urbanization. 
The urbanized Amazight typically live in bidonvilles on the outskirts of the 
cities and remain connected to their traditional roots (Entelis 1989: 107). As 
they become more socialized into this urban, "modern" world, many are 
redefining their ethnicity within this context. 
According to Cohen, when "two ethnic groups join together and interact 
politically and economically and establish a new political system, they will 
soon become involved on cleavages on economic and political lines running L/' ----- ' 
throughout the extent of the new society" (Cohen 1974: 95). When these 
cleavages transcend the ethnic group lines, they will form the new basis for 
identity. Ethnic and tribal affiliations will gradually weaken and disappear 
(Cohen 1974: 95). However, as in the Gase of the Amazight, if the difference~ l.. 
coincide with the existing ethnic affiliations, the cultural differences will 
become "entrenched, consolidated and strengthened in order to articulate the 
struggle between the two social groups across the new class lines" (Cohen 
1974: 96). The ultimate expression of this is the militant Amazightism in 
southern Morocco. 
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Ethnicity and politics are therefore inseparable. Without the political 
conditions and interactions present in Morocco, Amazight would cease to be a 
salient catagory. Modern ethnicity results not from isolation but from 
interaction (Cohen 1974: 96). The dynamic relations of the group and their 
culture with new positions of power places new emphasis on parts of the 
traditional culture and structure. Essentially, ethnicity has become a political 
organization, at least symbolically (Cohen 1974: 96-97). 
Additionally, it is impossible to segregate these issues of ethnicity from 
those of nationalism and state building. The increased militants in the south 
may result from their proximity to the "Western Sahara Question." The 
government as called upon a discourse of nationalism to elicit support for their 
occupation of the Western Sahara, culminating in the Green March, a peaceful 
civilian "invasion" of more than 100,000 people. This has linked the Amazight 
into concepts of self-determination and nationalism. This does not imply that 
they want separation from Morocco. 
Indeed, they want just the opposite, closer integration into Moroccan 
society. The Amazight see Morocco as "their" country. They are more than 
willing to share it with their partners in religious activity and fundamental 
beliefs and in the creation the independent Moroccan state, the Arabs. 
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However, the Amazight wish to maintain a separate ethnicity and integrate 
the concepts of their segmentary lineage based tribal heritag~ into the guiding 
political concepts of the modern Morocco. 
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Appendix II: List and Brief Biography of Cited Informants 
Abdul a middle aged Amazight living in Setti Fadma 
Abdulillah a student of English at the university in Kenitra, an Amazight 
from Oulmes 
Ali an Amazight with the same biography as above 
Akhmed an Amazight living outside Oulmes, approximately 35 years old. 
Studied Arabic literature at Al Karouain 
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Allal an Amazight living in Khemisset, a student at University of Mohammed 
V in Rabat. He is a Marxist revolutionary and activist for the Amazight cause. 
Amina a 21 year old Arab from Rabat 
Anas an Amazight from Khemisset in his early 20's; a member of the upper 
class 
Anna an American Peace Corps volunteer posted in Setti Fadma 
Aziz an Amazight from Khemisett, 35 years old 
Bila a 30is Amazight working as a mountain guide in Setti Fadma who has 
traveled throughout the world. 
Bouchara a 24 year old Amazight; she wrote her BA dissertation on 
Amazight poetry 
Madame Chaoui an Arab in her late 40's educated at AI Karouain 
Chebib a hotel owner in Setti Fadma from a mountain Amazight family, late 
50's 
Fetiha an Amazight woman in her twenties who lives in the bled outside 
Khemisset. 
Jamal an Amazight who runs a souvenir shop in Setti Fadma 
Halid an Amazight from Khemisset, a student in Rabat, 23 
Karima an Arab teacher of French in an Amazight area 
Om~r an Amazight rug dealer in Khemisset 
Mohammed an Amazight French teacher, 35 years old 
Mohammed M. a 22 year old student in Rabat. His comment grew out of 
discussion of political correctness in the United States 
Saied an Amazight in his mid twenties living in Setti Fadma. 
Salat an Arab in his mid twenties vacationing in Setti Fadma. His was 
educated in Italy. 
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Appendix III: Interview Questions 
The following is a list of example questions that framed discussions with 
informants. The list was compiled with the assistance of my adviser in 
Morocco, Dr. Susan Schaefer Davis. 
I know that there is a distinction between Arab and Amazight, which are you? 
How important is this distinction to you? 
What is uniquely Arab of Amazight, and not more generally Moroccan? 
What is the most important thing about being Arab or Amazight? 
What are the Characteristics of Amazight? Arabs? 
How do you classify others? 
How is it important to do that? 
What is the significance of Amazight Culture and being member of that 
culture? 
How have Arabs and Amazight influence each other 
Are people retaining their Amazight culture? How can you tell? 
It seems that many Arab and Amazight traditions are the same. Can you 
Explain this? 
How do you see the future of the Amazight in Morocco? 
What would you like the future of the Amazight in Morocco to be? 
Language 
How important is Amazight language to Amazight culture? 
Should schools be conducted in Amazight languages? 
Should Amazight languages be taught in schools? 
Tell me about written Amazight languages. 
Whom did you last speak with, and in what language? 
Marriage 
Would you rather marry an Arab or an Amazight? 
How are spouses chosen? 
What are the differences between Arab and Amazight marriages? 
What happens in a marriage ceremony? 
Women 
Are or should women be veiled? 
Who gets tattooed and why? 
Are less people getting tattooed now, and why? 
Religion 
Are Amazight of Arabs more religious? 
Does the practice of Islam vary? 
How do folk traditions effect Islam? 
What do you think about translating the Qur'an into Amazight for 
comprehension purposes? 
Political Issues 
Do you feel that Arabs and Amazights are treated differently by the 
government? 
76 
Have tribes remained important in Moroccan politics? 
How large is your tribe? 
Describe people's feelings about tribes and pride in their tribe. 
What Activities do members of your tribe participate in together? 
Does the tribe playa role in conflict in the community? 
Are political choices effected by tribal affiliation? 
Do you follow the tribes lead? 
Are Amazight political parties important? 
Do you make political choices based in being Arab or Amazight? 
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